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Abstract
I show the quasi-truth of a sentence in a partial structure to be equivalent
to the truth of a specific Ramsey sentence in a structure that corresponds
naturally to the partial structure. Hence quasi-truth, the core notion of the
partial structures approach, can be captured in the terms of the received
view on scientific theories as developed by Carnap and Hempel. I further
show that a mapping is a partial homomorphism/isomorphism between
two partial structures if and only if it is a homomorphism/isomorphism
between their corresponding structures. It is a corollary that the partial
structures approach can be expressed in first or second order model theory.
Keywords: partial structure; quasi-truth; pragmatic truth; partial truth;
subtruth; partial homomorphism; partial isomorphism; model theory;
expansion; Ramsey sentence; received view; logical empiricism
The partial structures approach is in the vanguard of the semantic view on scientific
theories and models (da Costa and French 2000; Le Bihan 2011, n. 3, §5), and is
one of the main reasons why the received view on scientific theories as developed
by, for example, Carnap (1966) and Hempel (1958) within logical empiricism
is considered inferior to the semantic view (French and Ladyman 1999). I will
show that the core notion of the partial structures approach, quasi-truth, can be
captured very naturally within the received view.
The partial structures approach is motivated by a simple epistemological point:
Most of the time, scientists do not have enough information about a domain to
determine its structure with arbitrary precision. For most relations, it is at best
known of some tuples of objects that they fall under the relation and known of
some objects that they do not fall under it. For many if not most tuples this is
unknown. Similarly, the value of a function is not know for all of its possible
arguments. Partial structures are defined to take this lack of knowledge into
account.
∗Theoretical Philosophy Unit, Utrecht University. sebastian.lutz@gmx.net. I thank Thomas
Müller and Janneke van Lith for helpful comments and Leszek Wron´ski for suggesting to describe
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Assume a languageL = {Ri , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , where Ri is an mi -place rela-
tion symbol for every i ∈ I , F j an n j -place function symbol for every j ∈ J , and
ck a constant symbol for every k ∈K .1 While most works on partial structures in
the philosophy of science (e. g., da Costa and French 1990; 2000) do not consider
functions, and the foundational paper by Mikenberg et al. (1986) does not consider
constants, the respective definitions can be easily combined to give
Definition 1. A˜ is a partialL -structure if and only if
A˜=


A,


RA˜,+i , R
A˜,−
i , R
A˜,◦
i

, F A˜j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , (1)
where

RA˜,+i , R
A˜,−
i , R
A˜,◦
i
	
is a partition of Ami for each i ∈ I , F A˜j : CA˜, j −→A is a
function with domain C
A˜, j ⊆An j for each j ∈ J , and c A˜k ∈A for each k ∈K .
The definition of partial structures by Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 1) is recov-
ered for K = ∅, the definition by da Costa and French (1990, 255f) for J = ∅.2
Lack of knowledge is represented by non-empty sets RA˜,◦i and sets CA˜, j ⊂An j , for
which F A˜j is a proper partial function on A
n j . Constant symbols are interpreted
as in a structure, and thus not used to express lack of knowledge.3
The core notion of the partial structures approach, quasi-truth, also takes
background knowledge into account, expressed by a set of L -sentences Π˜, the
primary statements (Mikenberg et al. 1986, def. 3; da Costa and French 1990, 256):
Definition 2. L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partialL -structure A˜ relative to Π˜ if
and only if there is anL -structureB with B =A, RA˜,+i ⊆ RBi ⊆Ami −RA,−i for
each i ∈ I , FBj |CA˜, j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J , and cBk = c A˜k for each k ∈K ,4 such that
B  Π˜∪{ϕ} . (2)
One of the most important properties of quasi-truth is that incompatible
sentences can be quasi-true without quasi-truth being trivial: Let A˜ be the partial
structure


A,


RA˜,+1 , R
A˜,−
1 , R
A˜,◦
1

, c A˜1

with A= {1,2,3}, RA˜,+1 = {1}, RA˜,−1 = {3},
1I will more or less follow the model theoretic notation of Chang and Keisler (1990), so that, for
example, A is the domain |A| of structure A, and RA is the extension of R in A.
2While da Costa and French (1990, 255) define partial structures only for relations, their further
definition of quasi truth presumes that partial structures can contain constants as well.
3Thus this treatment of constants cannot capture situations in which the values of constants are
unknown or not known with arbitrary precision (cf. Lutz 2011, §3.2).
4B is called an extension of A˜, and A˜-normal iffB  Π˜. If Π˜ is taken to contain the penumbral
connections of the language, an A˜-normal structure is a complete extension of an A˜-structure in the
sense of Fine (1975, §2). Quasi-truth is then subtruth (cf. Hyde 1997). Although partial structures
can thus formally be seen as giving vague denotations to a vocabulary, quasi-truth is meant as an
epistemic, not a semantic concept.
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c A˜1 = 2, and Π˜ =∅. Then R1(c) and ¬R1(c) are both quasi-true, while ¬∃xR(x) is
not.
In a partial structure, a relation symbol Ri has, in a sense, two separate
interpretations. For one, there are its clear instances RA˜,+i . They can be, for
example, determined by their verisimilitude to paradigmatic instances of Ri ,
or, more likely when it comes to scientific terms, given by the fulfillment of
some sufficient condition. Then there are also the clear non-instances RA˜,−i .
These are, for example, determined their verisimilitude to paradigmatic non-
instances of Ri , or by the failure to fulfill some necessary condition. The act of
determining whether some tuple is in RA˜,+i is thus more or less unrelated to any
act of determining whether some tuple is in RA˜,−i . (That a tuple is in R
A˜,◦
i will
typically only be determined by its being neither in RA˜,+i nor R
A˜,−
i .) Given the
difference in determining the members of RA˜,+i and of R
A˜,−
i , it is natural to assign
separate symbols of a language to these two concepts, say, R+i and R
−
i .
In a partial structure, the interpretation F A˜j of an n j -place function symbol
F j can be seen as the clear instances of an n j + 1-ary relation. In analogy to the
relation symbols in partial structures, it is natural to assign an n j +1-place relation
symbol F +j to the concept that determines these clear instances. If the argument
lies outside C
A˜, j , F
A˜
j does not have a value, and thus for every n j + 1-tuple not in
the relation named by F +j , it is unknown whether it falls under the function or
not. Thus there is no need for a relation symbol that names the clear non-instances
of F j .
5
Since constant symbols are interpreted in the usual way, this leads to a new
languageL ′ = {R+i , R−i , F +j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , chosen so that {R+i , R−i , F +j }i∈I , j∈J ∩
L =∅. Any partial structure forL determines a structure forL ′:
Definition 3. L ′-structure A corresponds to partial L -structure A˜ if and only
if |A| = A˜, R+i A = RA˜,+i and R−i A = RA˜,−i for each i ∈ I , F +j A = (x¯, y) |CA˜, j x¯
and F A˜j x¯ = y
	
for each j ∈ J , and cAk = c A˜k for each k ∈K .
x¯ is here a sequence of n j distinct variables, and x¯y the corresponding sequence
of n j + 1 variables. Note that for every partial structure A˜ there is exactly one
structure A that corresponds to A˜.
On a less direct level, the relation symbols R+i and R
−
i are of course connected,
since they are known to refer to instances and, respectively, non-instances of
the same relation symbol Ri from L . This connection, and the fact that over
5Incidentally, this treatment of functions cannot capture situations in which the values of
functions are only known up to a certain precision (cf. Lutz 2011, §3.2).
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a restricted domain, F +j is equivalent to a function F j are thus background as-
sumptions, that is, primary statements. They can be made explicit in language
L ∗ =L ∪L ′:
Π= Π˜∪⋃
i∈I
∀x¯(R+i x¯→ Ri x¯),∀x¯(R−i x¯→¬Ri x¯)	
∪⋃
j∈J
∀x¯∀y(F +j x¯y→ F j x¯ = y)	 (3)
Relation F +j
A can provide a sufficient condition for function values because by
definition 3, tuples in F +j
A cannot differ in their last elements if they do not also
differ in one of their previous elements.
Since the structure A corresponding to a partial L -structure A˜ is itself an
L ′-structure, Π cannot be true in C. However, Πmay be true in an expansion of
A toL ∗, which differs from A only in that it assigns extensions to the symbols
in L ∗ −L ′. With the help of corresponding structures, it is now possible to
describe quasi-truth relative to Π˜:
Claim 1. L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial L -structure A˜ with respect to Π˜ if
and only if the correspondingL ′-structure has an expansion C such that
C  {ϕ} ∪Π . (4)
Proof. ‘⇐’: Let A correspond to A˜ and C be an expansion of A such that C 
{ϕ}∪Π. Then C|L  Π˜∪{ϕ}, |C|L |= |C|=A, and RA˜,+i = R+i A = R+i C ⊆ RC|Li ⊆
Ami − R+i C = Ami − R+i A = Ami − RA,−i for each i ∈ I . Furthermore, for each
x¯ with C
A˜, j x¯, F
C|L
j x¯ = y if F
+
j
C x¯y, and, since F C|Lj is a function, also only if
F +j
C x¯y. Since further F +j
C = F +j
A, and F +j
A x¯y if and only if C
A˜, j x¯ and F
A˜
j x¯ = y,
it holds that F C|Lj |CA˜, j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J . Finally, c
C|L
k
= cAk = c
A
k . Thus C|L is
A˜-normal and hence ϕ is quasi-true in A˜.
‘⇒’: Let A be theL ′-structure that corresponds to A˜ and let ϕ be quasi-true
in A˜ with respect to Π˜. Then there is anL -structure B such that B  Π˜∪ {ϕ}
and R+i
A = RA˜,+i ⊆ RBi ⊆Ami −RA,−i =Ami −R−i A for each i ∈ I . Furthermore,
F A˜j = F
B
j |CA˜, j and thus for each x¯ ∈ An j and y ∈ A, F +j
A x¯y only if FBj x¯ = y for
each j ∈ J . Finally cAk = c A˜k = cBk for each k ∈ K . Define theL ∗-structure C so
that C|L ′ =A and C|L =B. Then C  {ϕ} ∪Π.
In other words, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if its corre-
sponding structure has an expansion in which {ϕ} ∪Π is true.6
6Two further important concepts of the partial structures approach, partial homomorphism and
partial isomorphism, can also be expressed with the help of corresponding structures (see appendix
A).
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In the new formalization of quasi-truth, the languageL ′ is, in keeping with
the basic motivation for partial structures, considered to be directly interpreted,
while the interpretation of L ∗ −L ′ = {Ri , F j }i∈I , j∈J is only given through
the interpretation of L ′ and the primary statements Π. This notion of a basic
vocabulary and an auxiliary vocabulary is the basis of many analyses in the received
view (Carnap 1966, §23; Hempel 1958, §2).7 In principle, all results from these
analyses can therefore be used for partial structures. I want to present only one.
IfL ∗ is finite, the Ramsey sentence RL ′(α) of anL ∗-sentence α is defined as∃i∈I Xi∃ j∈J Y jα†. To arrive at α†, one replaces in α the relation symbol Ri by the
mi -place relation variable Xi for every i ∈ I , and the function symbol F j by the
n j -place function variable Y j for every j ∈ J . This gives a new way to formulate
quasi-truth:
Claim 2. If Π˜ and L are finite, then L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial L -
structure A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if for the correspondingL ′-structure A it
holds that
A RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π . (5)
Proof. Since Π˜ and L are finite, so are L ∗ and Π. Therefore, by claim 1, ϕ is
quasi-true in A˜ if and only if A has an expansion C such that C  ϕ∧∧Π. Thus it
has to be shown that there is such an expansion if and only if A RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π.
‘⇐’: Since A  RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π, there is a relation Vi ⊆ Ami for every i ∈ I
and a function Gi : A
ni −→ A for every i ∈ I such that {Vi ,G j }i∈I , j∈J satisfies 
ϕ ∧∧Π† in A. Define C so that RCi =Vi for each i ∈ I , F Cj =G j for each j ∈ J ,
and C|L ′ =A. Induction on the complexity of ϕ ∧
∧
Π shows that C  ϕ ∧∧Π.
‘⇒’: Induction shows that {RCi , F Cj }i∈I , j∈J satisfies
 
ϕ ∧∧Π† in A, so that
C  ∃i∈I Xi∃ j∈J Y j
 
ϕ ∧∧Π†.
In other words, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧
Π

is true in the structure corresponding to A˜.
The features of quasi-truth that follow from definition 2 can now also be
recovered from claims 1 and 2. For example, that two incompatible sentences can
both be quasi-true in the same partial structure follows from the fact that, given
the primary statements Π, two incompatible sentences can have Ramsey sentences
that are true in a structure that corresponds to a partial structure.
Van Fraassen (1980, p. 56) has famously and influentially argued that, like most
results of logical empiricism, the Ramsey sentence is “off the mark”, a solution
7Incidentally, the sentences ∀x¯(R+i x¯ → ¬R−i x¯), i ∈ I and ∀x¯∀y∀v¯∀w(F +j x¯y ∧ F +j v¯w ∧ x¯ =
v¯ → y = w), j ∈ J , which follow from Π and contain only basic terms, express that in a partial
structure A˜, RA˜,+i ∩RA˜,−i =∅ for all i ∈ I and F A˜j is a partial function for all j ∈ J . Since they are
therefore basic presumptions of the formalism, they are good candidates for analytic sentences in
L ′ (cf. Carnap 1952).
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“to purely self-generated problems, and philosophically irrelevant.” If van Fraassen
was right, the preceding results would establish a reductio ad empirismum logicum
of the partial structures approach. But insofar as the partial structures approach
has proven its merits, the inference has to go in the opposite direction: The
tools developed within logical empiricism are more useful than its detractors have
acknowledged.
A Partial homomorphisms and isomorphisms
Bueno et al. (2002, 503f) define partial homomorphisms between partial struc-
tures:
Definition 4. A partial homomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial struc-
ture B˜ is a mapping f : A −→ B for which the following holds: If RA˜,+i x¯
then RB˜,+i f (x¯) for all i ∈ I , if CA˜, j x¯ then CB˜, j f (x¯) and for all x¯ with CA˜, j x¯,
f
 
F A˜j x¯

= F B˜j f (x¯) for all j ∈ J , and f
 
c A˜k

= cB˜k for all k ∈K .8
Bueno (1997, 596) introduces the notion of a partial isomorphism between
partial structures containing only relations, which can be generalized as follows:
Definition 5. A partial homomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial struc-
ture B˜ is a bijection f : A−→ B for which the following holds: RA˜,+i x¯ if and only
if RB˜,+i f (x¯) for all i ∈ I , CA˜, j x¯ if and only if CB˜, j f (x¯) and for all x¯ with C j ,A˜ x¯,
f
 
F A˜j x¯

= F B˜j f (x¯) for all j ∈ J , and f
 
c A˜k

= cB˜k for all k ∈K .
The differences between the two definitions are analogous to the differences
between the standard definitions of homomorphism and isomorphism between
structures (Hodges 1993, 5), so that they can be easily discussed together:9
Claim 3. Let A correspond to A˜, andB to B˜. Then f is a partial homomorphism/
partial isomorphism from A˜ to B˜ if and only if f is a homomorphism/isomorphism
from A toB.
Proof. The proof for relations and constants is immediate. For functions, the
following holds:
‘⇒’: For all j ∈ J , x¯ ∈ An j , and y ∈ A, F +j A x¯y if and only if CA˜, j x¯ and
F A,+j x¯ = y. This holds only if/if and only if CB˜, j f (x¯) and F
B˜
j f (x¯) = f (y), that
is, F +j
B˜ f (x¯) f (y).
8For an n-tuple x¯, f (x¯) =
 
f (x1), . . . , f (xn)

.
9The left hand side and the right hand side of the slash denote separate conjuncts of claim 3 and
its proof.
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‘⇐’: For all j ∈ J , C
A˜, j x¯ and F
A˜
j x¯ = y if and only if F
+
j
A x¯y. This holds only if/
if and only if F +j
B f (x¯) f (y), that is, C
B˜, j f (x¯) and F
B˜
j f (x¯) = f (y) = f
 
F A˜j x¯

.
Claims 1 and 3 reduce the concepts of the partial structures approach to the
model theory of first order logic, claims 2 and 3 reduce them to the model theory
of second order logic. For example, since the truth-value of a sentence of second
order logic is conserved under isomorphisms, it follows from claims 2 and 3 that
the quasi-truth-value of a sentence is conserved under partial isomorphisms.
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